We explain why underpricing in IPOs can be large in magnitude and clustered, using a signalling model where¯rms have private information about their qualities (high or low). A novel feature is that a¯rm, if perceived by the market as high quality, bene¯ts from the industry's publicity which is an increasing function of the amount of IPO underpricing by all high-quality¯rms in the industry. Two separating equilibria exist, in one no¯rm underprices IPO and the industry has no publicity; in the other every high-quality¯rm underprices IPO and the industry has great publicity. The two equilibria coexist when the industry's publicity has a strong positive e®ect on each high-quality¯rm's expected earnings. A strong industry publicity induces underpricing because it increases both the bene¯t for a high-quality¯rm to signal its quality and the temptation for a low-quality¯rm to mimic; to bene¯t from the publicity, a high-quality¯rm underprices its IPO to separate itself from a low-quality¯rm. This result is opposite to a typical externality story where the free-rider problem would reduce or eliminate IPO underpricing altogether.
Introduction
Initial public o®erings (IPOs) by Internet¯rms experienced phenomenal price gains in the¯rst half of 1999, implying huge underpricing in those IPO o®er prices. For example, the share price of MarketWatch.com rose to $97:50 on the¯rst trading day from an o®er price of $17. In contrast, concurrent IPOs by traditional¯rms did not exhibit a general pattern of underpricing. In fact, in the¯rst half of 1999 the IPO market was so concentrated on Internet¯rms and many of those IPOs performed so well that there was an increase in cancellations and withdraws from the IPO market by non-Internet¯rms. 1 Why do Internet¯rms o®er their IPOs at prices so much below market prices? And, more importantly, why does underpricing cluster in time and industry? In this paper we construct a model to explain.
We argue that both the large magnitude and the clustering of IPO underpricing can be due to great uncertainty in the demand for Internet products or services. Since most Internet¯rms make products/services that have no resemblance to but nevertheless compete against traditional ones, there is very little guidance to predicting the demand for such products. Market expectations on those¯rms' earnings are sensitive to positive \publicity" that the Internet industry as a whole generates. A great publicity for the industry is likely to attract customers and improve market expectations on earnings for each good¯rm in the industry. We show that, through the industry's publicity, IPO underpricing can be clustered and large in magnitude.
More precisely, we model each¯rm's o®er price and the fraction of shares issued to the public in IPO as devices to signal its quality. As in a typical signalling model (see later references), each rm's intrinsic quality (high or low) is known only to the¯rm itself and market expectations on ā rm's earnings increase with the perceived quality of the¯rm. In contrast to a typical signalling model, a¯rm's expected earnings also depend on the industry's publicity, which is modeled as an increasing function of the amount of IPO underpricing by high-quality¯rms in the industry.
A perceived high-quality¯rm's expected earnings increase with the industry's publicity by more than do a perceived low-quality¯rm's.
As in a typical signalling model, a low-quality¯rm tries to masquerade as high quality and so a high-quality¯rm can separate itself out only by taking actions that are too costly for a low-quality¯rm to take. This separation is possible here because the marginal cost of alternativē nancing methods such as borrowing is lower for a high-quality¯rm than for a low-quality¯rm.
By restricting the amount of funds raised through IPO, a high-quality¯rm indicates that its 1 quality is high to generate enough revenue to cover the resulted borrowing cost. Such signalling does not necessarily entail IPO underpricing; it does so only when the expected di®erence in expected earnings between a high-quality¯rm and a low-quality¯rm is su±ciently large. The industry's publicity induces underpricing by increasing such a di®erence.
There are two separating equilibria in this framework. 2 In one equilibrium there is large underpricing of IPOs by all high-quality¯rms, thus clustering, but in the other there is no underpricing. The no-underpricing equilibrium is the only equilibrium when the in°uence of the industry's publicity on each¯rm's expected earnings is weak. But when such in°uence is strong, the two equilibria coexist. The coexistence of the equilibria is due to self-ful¯lling expectations.
When a high-quality¯rm expects the industry's publicity to be high, the di®erence in expected earnings between a high-quality¯rm and a low-quality¯rm is great. Each individual highquality¯rm wants to bene¯t from the publicity by underpricing its own IPO, thereby creating the clustering in underpricing which ful¯lls the expectations of a high industry publicity. In contrast, when the industry's publicity is expected to be low, the bene¯t from underpricing one's own IPO is small and so no individual¯rm wants to underprice its IPO, supporting the expectations of a low industry publicity. In this case, high-quality¯rms signal instead by o®ering fewer shares to the public at the full price.
The underpricing equilibrium entails large underpricing. When all high-quality¯rms are expected to underprice, the bene¯t from the industry's publicity is so large that makes lowquality¯rms very likely to mimic high-quality¯rms; to signal successfully a high-quality¯rm must incur a su±ciently high cost in the form of great underpricing. In a simple version of the model, a high-quality¯rm gives some shares free to the public in the underpricing equilibrium.
It should be emphasized that high-quality¯rms underprice IPOs here in order to bene¯t from the industry's publicity rather than build one's own, although we also examine the latter motive.
Given that the industry's publicity is a public good, the positive link established here between the clustering of IPO underpricing and the industry's publicity is opposite to a typical externality story. In usual circumstances, each high-quality¯rm wants to enjoy the publicity that other¯rms' create through IPO underpricing but is reluctant to underprice its own (since IPO underpricing is costly). What overcomes this free-rider problem in our framework is the presence of private information about¯rms' qualities. Since a¯rm can bene¯t from the industry's publicity only when it can convince the market of its high quality, a greater industry publicity makes each high-quality¯rm more willing to signal. At the same time a greater industry publicity makes signalling more di±cult by increasing low-quality¯rms' temptation to mimic, therefore making IPO underpricing a necessary action for successfully signalling quality. 3 There is a large literature on IPO underpricing. Pioneering examples of signalling models include Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Welch (1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , who focus on a single¯rm's signalling decisions. The main contribution of the current paper to this literature is to show that large underpricing can be clustered in time and industry. In addition, our paper recovers a U -shaped relationship between the fraction of shares issued to the public in IPO and expected earnings. When expected earnings increase from a low level, a high-quality¯rm signals the quality by reducing the number of shares issued to the public, without underpricing IPO.
When expected earnings increase from a high level, the¯rm signals by underpricing IPO and increasing the number of shares issued to the public. This result reconciles the IPO signalling literature with the lack of a monotonic relationship between the IPO price and the fraction of shares withheld by¯rms' original owners (Michaely and Shaw (1994) ).
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There are other theories that explain IPO underpricing. For example, Rock (1986) argues that underpricing is an outcome of the winner's curse, since uninformed investors must be compensated with a low o®er price in order to participate. Others attribute a role to underwriters in IPOs (e.g., Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989) ). Although these alternative explanations are useful and do not necessarily contradict the signalling story, it is not clear how they imply the clustering of IPO underpricing. For the focus of this paper, we will abstract from any role of underwriters. The emphasis on a¯rm's own desire to underprice underscores the rationality of such underpricing. 5 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the demand uncertainty facing Internet¯rms and the signalling game in IPO. Section 3 solves for the signalling equilibrium, taking as given the earning di®erence between a high-quality and a low-quality¯rm.
Section 4 solves for market equilibria where expected earnings depend on the amount of underpricing in the industry. Section 5 explores several extensions. Section 6 concludes the paper and the appendix provides necessary proofs.
3 In the current model, clustering occurs as¯rms try to signal their qualities. This is di®erent from the so-called \herd" behavior (Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, et al (1992) ), where agents ignore their private information and follow previous agents' actions. An apparent di®erence between the two types of behavior is that herding occurs only when¯rms move sequentially but clustering can occur when¯rms move simultaneously. 4 The role of alternative¯nancing methods such as borrowing also links our model generally to Myers and Majluf (1984) and speci¯cally to James and Wier (1990) and Slovin and Young (1990) . The latter two papers have shown that IPOs of¯rms with previously established borrowing relationships are underpriced less than other IPOs. We do not examine this use of previous borrowing records to signal but rather the reverse casaulity: Underpricing IPO forces a¯rm to use alternative¯nancing methods. 5 Despite the huge underpricing, Internet¯rms do not seem to lay blames on their underwriters. As one chief executive o±cer of a newly public Internet¯rm put it, \We don't second-guess what we left on the table. Our eyes are on the future in terms of building a great company." (Smith and Simon, 1999 
The Structure of the Model
Consider an industry with n¸2 risk-neutral¯rms, each having a project that requires external nancing of an amount normalized to one. The project's quality, denoted x, is either x H (highquality) or x L (low-quality), where x H > x L > 0. The precise value of x is known only to thē rm. The public has the prior belief that x = x H with probability ® and x = x L with probability 1¡®, where ® 2 (0; 1). To simplify analysis, let us assume that all n¯rms decide to seek¯nancing at the same time (see Section 5 for discussions on sequential decisions).
A¯rm can raise the required amount by initial public o®ering (IPO) of its equity. Let the total number of shares of a¯rm be 1. The¯rm chooses the number of shares to be issued to the public in IPO, f 2 (0; 1], and the o®er price s. The original owners of the¯rm keep 1 ¡ f shares. The market price is denoted p. The shares are said to be underpriced if s < p. Denote the amount of underpricing by d´p ¡ s. The amount of fund raised through IPO is q´sf .
If q < 1, the remainder of the investment is obtained through alternative¯nancing methods.
Although there may be many such alternative methods, we will simply refer to them as borrowing.
The total cost of borrowing is
(1 ¡ q) for q < 1, where b > 0 is a constant. Thus, for each dollar borrowed, there is an additional cost bx ¡1 . An important feature is that the borrowing cost is a decreasing function of the project's quality. This is realistic: Although the project's quality is unknown to the public, the lenders can screen the project to¯nd the true quality with positive probability and hence o®er a lower loan rate to high-quality projects. Note also that, for simplicity, the borrowing cost is assumed to be linear in the amount of borrowing. 6 Let a¯rm's earning be r H if it is high-quality and r L if it is low-quality. There are two components in earnings. The¯rst component depends on the project's quality and is R 0 x i =x L for the project with quality i = H; L, where R 0 > 0. This component is known to the¯rm and is known to the market once the project's quality is revealed. We refer to this component as intrinsic earnings of the¯rm. The second component of the earnings is uncertain to the¯rm and hence uncertain to the market even when the project's quality is observed. Let this component be m for a high-quality¯rm and, to simplify, 0 for a low-quality¯rm. Then, the earnings for a low-quality¯rm and a high-quality¯rm are:
The uncertain component m is meant to capture the uncertainty in the demand for products in a new industry, such as the Internet industry. Most Internet¯rms produce products or services 6 All analytical results in this paper hold also for the cost function (1+b=x)C(1¡q) with the properties C(0) = 0, C 0 (0)¸1 and C 00 > 0.
4 that have no resemblance to traditional ones, but they nevertheless compete against traditional sectors for customers. 7 Public awareness of the industry is important to the growth of each¯rm in the industry. Spectacular price gains in IPOs create such publicity. Moreover, a high-qualitȳ rm bene¯ts more from the industry's publicity than does a low-quality¯rm and so the expected value of m is positive.
To focus on the positive externality created by the industry's publicity, we abstract from the competition among¯rms in the industry (see Section 6 for a discussion). For the moment we also abstract from the e®ect a¯rm's IPO underpricing has on its own expected earnings (Section 5 analyzes this e®ect) and assume that market expectations on a¯rm's m depend only on other rms' underpricing. Precisely, let D be the amount of underpricing in IPO by a representativē rm that is perceived as high quality; if the market perceives a¯rm to be high quality, the expectations on m conditional on D are
where ½ 2 (0; 1) is a constant. We assume that n is a large number so that a high-quality¯rm's own expectations on m at the time of deciding the o®er price, conditional on D, are arbitrarily close to the market's expectation.
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Market expectations of a perceived high-quality¯rm are R H´R0 x H =x L + ½D. Since each individual¯rm takes D as given, R H is exogenous to each¯rm. Let I be the probability with which the market believes that a¯rm is high-quality, after observing all n¯rms' IPO prices.
Then the¯rm's earning expected by the market is
The game is played as follows. First, each¯rm simultaneously chooses and commits to o®ering f shares of its equity at an o®er price s, while taking R H as given. After IPO the¯rm borrows if the IPO receipts are not su±cient to cover the project's investment. Finally, the project is carried out and the earnings are realized. Each¯rm pays the creditors¯rst if there is any debt and then to the shareholders. Notice that at the time of IPO the¯rm's borrowing cost is not 7 For example, selling books, auctioning goods, providing market information on Internet compete directly against businesses that organize such activities in traditional ways. 8 This assumption is made for simplicity. When a¯rm makes the IPO decision, it does not observe other¯rms' IPO decisions and so its expectations of its own m are ½D [ 
n¡1 is the probability that there is at least one other high-quality¯rm coming to the IPO market. Such expectations are di®erent from market expectations (which are made after observing all¯rms' IPO decisions) and the discrepancy by itself can make the o®er price deviate from the market price. This discrepancy vanishes when n is large or when¯rms move sequentially (Section 5).
Also, one can specify D as the average of underpricing by other high-quality¯rms rather than the amount of underpricing by a representative high-quality¯rm as is done here. The analytical results will not change.
publicly observed since the borrowing has not yet occurred, although the amount of borrowing 1 ¡ q can be inferred. We also assume that the net risk-free rate is zero and that the product market customers have the same information as the investors.
Let us isolate an arbitrary¯rm and examines its decision. It is convenient to express thē rm's decisions as a´(f; q) rather than (f; s). In choosing a, the¯rm intends to maximize the expected return to the original owners, which is
This return is known to the¯rm, since the¯rm's quality x is known to the¯rm itself.
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To investors, what matters is the expected return from holding the¯rm's shares, which is
where
L . Let p I be the market price of a¯rm's share when the market belief is I. Under rational expectations, the market price equals the expected return to shareholders and so the expected rate of return per share equals the risk-free rate. Also, for investors to participate in IPO, the o®er price cannot exceed the market price. Thus
As is standard in this environment, a high-quality¯rm may want to signal its quality. One way to signal is to reduce the amount of funds raised through IPO. Since any amount that is not nanced through equity must be obtained through alternative¯nancing methods which bear an additional cost, reducing the fund raised through IPO signals that the¯rm's earning ability might be su±ciently high to justify such a cost. Signalling can be done through the o®er price and/or the number of shares issued to the public in IPO. Since all¯rms want the market to believe that they are high quality, a low-quality¯rm may want to mimic a high-quality¯rm. A necessary condition for successful signalling by a high-quality¯rm is that it has a higher incentive or ability to signal than does a low-quality¯rm. This is the well-known single-crossing property, satis¯ed in the current model in the following forms:
These properties are illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b. The relation (2.6) states that, to receive the same increase in the expectations on earnings \rewarded" by the market, a high-quality¯rm is willing to reduce the fund raised through IPO by more than does a low-quality¯rm. Since the number of shares issued to the public is held¯xed in (2.6), the relation equivalently states that a high-quality¯rm is willing to reduce the o®er price by more than does a low-quality¯rm for the same reward in expected earnings. (2.7) states that, for¯xed IPO receipts, a high-quality¯rm is willing to increase the number of shares issued to the public by more than does a low-quality¯rm in order to receive the same reward in expected earnings. Since the IPO receipts are held¯xed in (2.7), the relation again states that a high-quality¯rm is more willing to underprice its IPO than a low-quality¯rm. Both properties come directly from the assumption that a high-qualitȳ rm faces a lower borrowing cost than a low-quality¯rm.
Figures 1a and 1b here.
To focus on interesting cases, we now narrow our attention:
A high-quality¯rm, if its quality is publicly known, can make a positive return even when the investment is 100% debt¯nanced, i.e.,
1B. A low-quality¯rm, if its quality is publicly known, cannot make a positive return when the investment is 100% debt¯nanced, i.e.,
1C. A low-quality¯rm has a positive payo® if the investment is 100% equity¯nanced, even when the¯rm's quality is publicly known. That is,
1D. The intrinsic earning di®erence between high-quality and low-quality¯rms is not too large:
Assumption 1A provides a high-quality¯rm with an incentive to signal its quality: Since it makes a positive return even with 100% debt¯nancing, it can reduce the IPO receipt to signal its high quality. The signalling attempt may or may not require underpricing of IPO. Assumptions 1B and 1C make it desirable for a low-quality¯rm to¯nance its investment through equity if its quality is publicly known. Since the quality is not publicly known, these assumptions do not preclude a low-quality¯rm from using debt¯nancing to mimic a high-quality¯rm. Assumption 1D is used to isolate the importance of externality in¯rms' decisions to underprice IPO: In absence of the externality, Assumption 1D ensures that there is no underpricing (see Section 4).
Assumption 1C can be simpli¯ed. To do so, we obtain the maximum payo® to a low-qualitȳ rm when the¯rm's quality is publicly known. With known low quality, the market price of thē
Since the number of shares issued in the IPO must satisfy f¸q=p L , the payo® to a known low-quality¯rm satis¯es
The last expression is increasing in q and so it is maximized at q = 1, generating a value R 0 ¡ 1.
Conversely, if a low-quality¯rm chooses to reveal its low quality, it can always choose the actions (q; f ) = (1; 1=R 0 ) and obtain the payo® R 0 ¡ 1. Thus, Assumption 1C can be replaced by:
Before getting into the details of the signalling game, it is important to note that the externality per se does not generate clustering of underpricing, as stated below:
Proposition 2.1. If¯rms' qualities are public information then there is no underpricing in equilibrium.
When each¯rm's quality is public knowledge, there is no need for a high-quality¯rm to signal its quality and a low-quality¯rm cannot masquerade as a high-quality¯rm. Each¯rm's payo® is maximized by setting q to 1 and the o®er price to the corresponding market price. Each high-quality¯rm wants to bene¯t from other high-quality¯rms' underpricing but is unwilling to underprice its own IPO. This free-rider problem ensures that in equilibrium with public information there is no underpricing by any¯rm. The existence of private information is critical for overcoming this free-rider problem.
Signalling Equilibrium
For arbitrarily given R H that satis¯es Assumptions 1A ¡ 1D, we characterize a¯rm's strategies.
The result is a best response by the¯rm to other¯rms' strategies. For lack of an appropriate term, we refer to this single¯rm's best response together with the market's belief as a signalling equilibrium. In contrast, the true equilibrium where R H is also determined is called a market equilibrium, an object examined in the next section.
A Bayesian perfect signalling equilibrium is such that for any given R H that satis¯es Assumptions 1A ¡ 1D, the following conditions hold: (i) The choices (f; q) maximize the¯rm's payo® 8 V (f; q; R I ; x) given the beliefs; and (ii) The beliefs are rational according to Bayes updating given the¯rm's choices. As is well known, this de¯nition does not su±ciently limit the scope of equilibrium since the beliefs o® the equilibrium path are arbitrary. In this paper we will employ the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) to re¯ne the equilibrium (see below) and throughout this paper the term \equilibrium" means an equilibrium that satis¯es this criterion.
Two types of signalling equilibria may exist. One is pooling equilibria in which both highquality and low-quality¯rms take the same action; the other is separating equilibria in which the two types of¯rms take di®erent actions and market's beliefs sort them out according to their actions. Although separating equilibria are the interest of our analysis, oddly enough the best way to describe them is to describe a pooling equilibrium¯rst.
Suppose that the two types of¯rms take the same action a 0´( f 0 ; q 0 ) in a pooling equilibrium.
Then the market's belief upon observing a 0 is that the¯rm is high-quality with probability
Denote the payo® to a high-quality¯rm in this pooling equilibrium by
as the payo® to a low-qualitȳ rm. For the action and the belief to form a pooling equilibrium, the following necessary (but not su±cient) conditions must be met:
The¯rst condition is self-explanatory; the second condition requires the o®er price to be at most the market price; the last condition requires a low-quality¯rm's payo® in the pooling equilibrium to be at least that from revealing the¯rm's type and choosing (q; f ) = (1; 1=R 0 ). This condition also implies that a high-quality¯rm gets a higher payo® in the pooling equilibrium than from choosing (q; f ) = (1; 1=R 0 ) and being viewed by the market as a low-quality¯rm.
The conditions (3.1) and (3.2) can be written in more useful forms. First, since q 0 =f 0 · p ® , the restriction f 0 2 [0; 1] is equivalent to p ®¸q0¸0 . With the expression of price in (3.2), (3.1)
can be rewritten as
Also, the payo®s V 0 (x H ) and V 0 (x L ) are bounded above by R ® ¡ 1. Intuitively, the amount R ® ¡ 1 is the¯rm's payo® when the¯rm obtains the expected earnings R ® without incurring any 9 borrowing cost. This is the best the original owners can get in a pooling equilibrium, since the pooling equilibrium may involve less than 100% equity¯nancing. This intuition is stated below (see Appendix A for a proof).
In the set of actions that satisfy (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), only those that do not leave any room for \credible" deviations by a high-quality¯rm satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. To describe a credible deviation by a high-quality¯rm, suppose a deviation (f; q) 6 = (f 0 ; q 0 ) satis¯es the following conditions. First, the deviation is feasible for a high-quality¯rm, i.e., f; q 2 [0; 1]
and the o®er price does not exceed the implied market price:
Second, the deviation generates a lower payo® to a low-quality¯rm than in the pooling equilibrium, even when the¯rm is viewed as a high-quality¯rm as a result of the deviation:
Third, the deviation generates a higher payo® to the high-quality¯rm than in the pooling equilibrium when the¯rm is viewed as a high-quality¯rm as a result of the deviation:
Actions (f; q) that satisfy (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) are credible deviations by a high-quality¯rm.
The credible deviations can be understood as follows. Deviations that satisfy (3.6) and (3.7)
are feasible to the¯rms but yield lower payo®s to a low-quality¯rm than in the pooling equilibrium, even when the deviator is given the bene¯t of doubt and viewed as a high-quality¯rm.
Thus, a low-quality¯rm will not make such deviations. If the deviations also satisfy (3.8), a high-quality¯rm would want to make such deviations, given that the market views the deviator as a high-quality¯rm. Thus, observing deviations that satisfy (3.6) { (3.8), the market should intuitively interpret the deviator as a high-quality¯rm. To satisfy this intuitive criterion, a pooling equilibrium cannot allow for deviations that satis¯es (3.6){(3.8). This restriction on beliefs o® the equilibrium path eliminates a plethora of equilibria. 10 Let us¯rst examine the set of actions that satisfy (3.6) and (3.7). Under Assumption 1A, (3.6) can be rewritten as f; q 2 [0; 1] and
10 In the current context, separating equilibria that satisfy the intuitive criterion are the Riley (1979) outcomes.
To rewrite (3.7), de¯ne a critical level of q as
Note that Q 1 is less than one but is not necessarily greater than zero, depending on the magnitude
The notation IN D L indicates that a low-quality¯rm is indi®erent between choosing the pooling action (f 0 ; q 0 ) and being viewed as a high-quality¯rm by choosing actions satisfying f = IND L (q). The set of actions that satisfy the above restrictions is the shaded area in Figure 2a for Q 1 < 0 and in Figure 2b for Q 1 > 0.
Figures 2a and 2b here.
The following lemma formally states some properties of the two curves S H (q) and
in Figures 2a and 2b (see Appendix A for a proof):
is an increasing and concave function for all q > Q 1 . S H (q) is an increasing and concave function for all q > 0. If
in the range q¸Q 1 , denoted Q A , and IND L (q) > S H (q) if and only if q > Q A . Furthermore, a high-quality¯rm's payo® is an increasing function of q along f = S H (q) and a decreasing function
A high-quality¯rm can consider a deviation from the supposed pooling equilibrium to actions in the shaded areas in Figures 2a and 2b . As argued before, the market should intuitively view such deviations as coming from a high-quality¯rm and attach a belief I = 1 to the deviation.
By the same token, a high-quality¯rm should consider only deviations that maximize its payo®.
That is, any deviations in the shaded area that are not the best cannot be an equilibrium that satis¯es the Cho-Kreps criterion, since further deviations from those actions to the best actions do not change the market's belief (I = 1) but increase the¯rm's payo®.
The best deviation by a high-quality¯rm from the supposed pooling equilibrium is arbitrarily close to and above the action depicted by point A in Figure 2a 11 That is, the best deviation is
We now check whether this deviation increases the payo® to a high-quality¯rm. Relative to the pooling equilibrium, the deviation (f b ; q b ) generates the following gain to a high-quality¯rm:
The¯rst equality follows from adding and subtracting the same terms; the second equality follows from the fact that the term in f:g is zero by the de¯nitions of (f b ; q b ); the third equality follows from substituting the de¯nitions of q b and q 0 .
The payo® to a high-quality¯rm from the deviation to (f b ; q b ) is greater than in any pooling
In this case, there is no pooling equilibrium (that satis¯es the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion) and so the best action for a low-quality¯rm is (f; q) = (1=R 0 ; 1), yielding a payo®
L and we denote the corresponding values of (f b ; q b ) by (f ¤ ; q ¤ ). That is, for
and for
We have the following propositions (see Appendix B for a proof): The reason that some pooling equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps re¯nement is that the amount of funds raised through IPO cannot be less than zero. This limits the extent to which a highquality¯rm can signal. When the expected earning of a high-quality¯rm is su±ciently higher than that of a low-quality¯rm, the high-quality¯rm must incur a su±ciently high signalling cost in order to prevent a low-quality from mimicking. With the lower bound on the amount of fund raised through IPO, this becomes di±cult and so some pooling equilibria with small IPO receipts can survive. In particular, when the prior for a high-quality¯rm, ®, is large, the di®erence between R ® and R 0 is large and so the bene¯t from mimicking is large. Even with a very low q, a low-quality¯rm may get a higher payo® from mimicking than from taking the separating action, in which case the pooling equilibrium exists. When ® is small, in contrast, mimicking does not pay and so the pooling equilibrium does not exist.
A high-quality¯rm has a preference over the two ways to signal. One is to reduce the number of shares issued to the public in IPO without underpricing and the other is to underprice IPO. Both methods reduce the amount of funds raised through IPO and achieve the purpose of signalling. However, reducing the number of shares without underpricing IPO is preferable. By reducing the number of shares issued to the public without underpricing, the¯rm keeps a larger stake of the¯rm and hence of its future earnings. In contrast, if the¯rm underprices its IPO it must give up a large number of shares to the public in IPO in order to raise the same amount of funds. This is more costly to the original owners of the¯rm than the¯rst method since they
give up a larger claim on the¯rm's future earnings.
Despite this preference, a high-quality¯rm chooses to underprice IPO in some cases. This is because there is a limit to which a high-quality¯rm can signal by reducing f . Even reducing f to zero can only signal an expected earning of R 0 + bx ¡1 L . 12 For expected earnings that are higher than this level, the¯rm must sacri¯ce even more in order to prevent a low-quality¯rm from mimicking and this requires underpricing IPO.
12 This is obtained by setting (f; q) = (0; 0) and V 0 (xL) = R0 ¡ 1 in the equality form of (3.11).
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Therefore, the number of shares issued by the¯rm to the public in IPO has a U -shaped relationship with the¯rm's expected earnings, as depicted in Figure 3 . When a high-qualitȳ rm's expected earnings increase from low levels, the number of shares issued to the public decreases, while IPO is at the full market price. This continues until the number of shares issued to the public reaches a minimum (which is zero in this version of the model). When expected earnings increase further, there is no more room to cut the number of shares issued to the public and so the¯rm signals by discounting IPO and increasing f . When the minimum of f is above zero, as shown in Section 5, the response of f to expected earnings can still be U -shaped even in the underpricing region. This absence of a monotonic (negative) relationship between f and underpricing is in contrast to previous signalling models but is consistent with the empirical nding of Michaely and Shaw (1994) .
Figures 3 and 4 here.
A high-quality¯rm's best response to other high-quality¯rms' decisions can be summarized by an underpricing curve, depicted in Figure 4 . Denote 
(3.16)
Market Equilibrium
Now we solve for the market equilibrium by solving for the expected earnings R H . From now on only the separating equilibrium is considered. Since such equilibrium is unique for any given R H , the multiplicity of market equilibria in this section has nothing to do with the usual multiplicity associated with signalling equilibria; instead, it arises because multiple values of R H can be supported by rational expectations. Thus, when 0 · ½ < ½, only the no-underpricing market equilibrium exists; when ½ · ½ < 1, both the underpricing equilibrium and the no-underpricing equilibrium exist. Figure 4 depicts the case ½ < ½ < 1. The no-underpricing market equilibrium is at point EN and the underpricing market equilibrium is at point EU . 13 Several aspects of the above proposition are noteworthy. First, the no-underpricing equilibrium exists for all ½ 2 [0; 1). It is the only equilibrium when 0 · ½ < ½, in which case the level D 0 is su±ciently large and the underpricing curve is su±ciently°at that the entire underpricing curve lies below the 45-degree line in Figure 4 . An implication of this result is that there would be no IPO underpricing if there were no externality through the industry's publicity. 14 Second, the underpricing equilibrium and the no-underpricing equilibrium both exist when the externality is su±ciently strong (i.e. when ½ · ½ < 1). The coexistence of the two types of equilibria is an outcome of self-ful¯lling expectations. If a high-quality¯rm expects that other high-quality¯rms will not underprice, the di®erence in expected earnings between a high-qualitȳ rm and a low-quality¯rm is not large, as maintained by Assumption 1D. Then the low-qualitȳ rm's temptation to mimic is not very strong, in which case a high-quality¯rm can separate itself from a low-quality¯rm by reducing the number of shares in IPO without underpricing. In contrast, if a high-quality¯rm expects that other high-quality¯rms will underprice, the di®erence in expected earnings between a high-quality¯rm and a low-quality¯rm is large, due to the industry's publicity. A low-quality¯rm's temptation to mimic is strong in this case and so underpricing is necessary for a high-quality¯rm to separate itself from a low-quality¯rm. The coexistence of a no-underpricing equilibrium with the underpricing equilibrium illustrates the fragility of large underpricing in IPOs.
Third, the large underpricing tends to be clustered in time and in particular industries, since underpricing is the best response to other¯rms' underpricing in the underpricing equilibrium.
As noted before (Proposition 2.1), the externality through the industry's publicity is necessary 13 When ½ · ½ < 1, there might also be a mixed-strategy equilibrium at D = D 0 if we allow each high-qualitȳ rm to underprice with a probability in (0; 1). To the issues that we focus on in this paper, such as clustering of underpricing, examining the mixed-strategy equilibrium does not add much.
14 As noted before, Assumption 1D is important for this result. When the intrinsic earning di®erence between a high-quality and a low-quality¯rm is large enough to violate Assumption 1D, then ½ < 0 and there is a need for a high-quality¯rm to underprice anyway. In fact, only the underpricing equilibrium exists in this case.
for the clustering in our story, but it alone would suppress clustering rather than induce it: The free-rider problem presented by the externality tends to reduce each high-quality¯rm's incentive to underprice. It is the asymmetric information and hence high-quality¯rms' desire to signal the quality that induces each of them to underprice. That is, by increasing the bene¯t for low-qualitȳ rms to mimic, the externality through publicity forces a high-quality¯rm to underprice IPO if it wants to signal its quality and to capture the bene¯t of the externality. In fact, the stronger the externality (i.e., the larger the ½), the larger the underpricing.
Besides expectations, whether a high-quality¯rm underprices and by how much it underprices depend also on some fundamental features of the economy. One such fundamental is the borrowing cost, which can be captured by the parameter b. When b is larger, the borrowing cost is higher and underpricing is more costly for a¯rm, since underpricing forces the¯rm to borrow. In this case, the minimum level of ½ that is necessary for inducing underpricing is higher, making underpricing less likely. The amount of underpricing is also lower. Simply put, a higher borrowing cost makes signalling more e®ective and so less or no underpricing is needed.
Another fundamental is the average earnings by¯rms in the sector. Since a decrease in R 0 reduces expected earnings of both a high-quality¯rm and a low-quality¯rm, it reduces the average expected earnings. Similar to an increase in the borrowing cost, a decrease in R 0 makes underpricing less likely and reduces the amount of underpricing if underpricing occurs. This is because a reduction in R 0 reduces the intrinsic earnings di®erence between a high-quality¯rm and a low-quality¯rm, which reduces the temptation for a low-quality¯rm to mimic and hence reduces the need for underpricing as a signalling method.
Both b and R 0 are likely to°uctuate over business cycles. Since a business downturn is likely to generate both a higher borrowing cost and a lower average earnings, the frequency of underpricing and the magnitude of underpricing are likely to be lower in business downturns than in expansions. Likewise, underpricing is likely to be more common in economies where¯rms have an easy access to the credit market than in economies with a di±cult access.
The model is capable of producing large underpricing. In this version of the model, an underpricing¯rm o®ers the shares free of charge! That is, when the expected earning di®erence between a high-quality¯rm and a low-quality¯rm passes the critical level bx ¡1 L , the amount of underpricing jumps discontinuously from zero to 100% and the o®er price drops to zero. Of course, a zero o®er price is unrealistic. The section below extends the model to generate a positive o®er price in the underpricing equilibrium. Also, we investigate alternative assumptions about the externality and the timing structure of the signalling game. 16 
Extensions

Lower Bound on Equity Financing
A¯rm may not be able to borrow as much as it likes. This puts a lower bound on the amount of fund that the¯rm must raise through IPO. Let this lower bound be Q b s=p, where Q b 2 (0; 1).
This speci¯cation incorporates the idea that, if a¯rm's IPO experiences a price gain, lenders may lend more to the¯rm (particularly when the lender is uninformed about the¯rm's quality even after screening). Substituting the expression for p, the constraint q¸Q b s=p for a high-qualitȳ rm can be written as: Two properties of the separating equilibrium in this extension are in contrast with the simple model. First, an underpricing¯rm's o®er price can be positive, as at point B in Figure 5 .
Second, the number of shares issued to the public by a¯rm does not necessarily increase with the earnings when the amount of underpricing is small. In Figure 5 , for example, when R H increases, the curve f = IN D L (q) shifts up but the curve f = LB(q) shifts down. These two forces change f in opposite ways and so analytically the e®ect of R H on f is ambiguous in the underpricing equilibrium. When the externality is su±ciently strong, however, f is likely to increase with R H .
In this case the magnitude of underpricing is large, as in the simple model.
A Firm's Own In°uence on Publicity
In the simple model we assumed that a high-quality¯rm bene¯ts from other high-quality¯rms'
IPO underpricing but not from its own underpricing. However, it is frequently suggested that ā rm underprices IPO to create publicity for itself. To investigate this motive, let us return to the simple model and modify the speci¯cation of market expectations on m as E(mjD; d; perceived quality of the¯rm = x H ) = ½(°d + D); where°> 0 is the relative impact of the¯rm's own underpricing on its expected earnings. The simple model examined before corresponds to°= 0. To facilitate discussion in the current case, let us restrict 0 · ½ < 1=°.
, which depends on the¯rm's own action, the¯rm cannot take R H as given. Denote the part that the¯rm takes as given by
The market price of a¯rm under the market's belief I can be found as
The constraint s · p H can be written as
3)
The following proposition shows that the qualitative results in this extended environment are similar to those in the simple model (see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 5.1. There exist°1 > 0 and ½ 1 2 (0; 1=(1 +°)) such that an underpricing equilibrium exists if ½ 2 (½ 1 ; 1=(1 +°)) and°·°1. There exist°2 > 0 and ½ 2 2 (0; 1=°) such that a no-underpricing market equilibrium exists if 0 · ½ < ½ 2 and°·°2. Moreover, ½ 1 < ½ 2 and so the two market equilibria coexist when ½ 2 (½ 1 ; ½ 2 ) and°· minf°1;°2g.
Sequential Decisions
The simple model illustrates the tendency for IPO underpricing to cluster if¯rms go to the IPO market at the same time. Given d 1 ,¯rm 2's pricing decision is analogous to that analyzed in the simple model. That is, if¯rm 2 is a low-quality¯rm, then d 2 = 0; if¯rm 2 is a high-quality¯rm, then
where D 0 is de¯ned in (3.15).
For¯rm 1, it anticipates the in°uence of its pricing decision on¯rm 2's. Given the prior on rm 2's quality,¯rm 1's expectations on¯rm 2's amount of underpricing are
and there is no publicity from which¯rm 1 can bene¯t. In this case¯rm 1's best decision is d 1 = 0 and the payo® to both¯rms is identical to that in the no-underpricing equilibrium in the simple case. This can be a market equilibrium in the current case if and only if the payo® to¯rm 1 is not lower than that generated by the action d 1¸D0 .
Now suppose¯rm 1 chooses d 1¸D0
. If the market believes that the¯rm is high-quality with probability I, then the expected earning of the¯rm is
Slightly abuse notation to denote
The market price of such a¯rm under the belief I is
This is similar in form to the market price in the last subsection, with ®½ 2 replacing ½°, and so the o®er price decision of¯rm 1 can be analyzed analogously to that in the proof of Proposition As the example shows, there are cases in which IPO underpricing occurs. The important point is that, when¯rm 1 underprices IPO,¯rm 2 will do so as well if it is high quality. Since such underpricing would not occur if the¯rm were the only one in the industry or if publicity had no e®ect on expected earnings, the result shows the tendency of clustering in underpricing, just as in the case of simultaneous decisions. It is not surprising then that underpricing in the case of sequential moves also requires the externality to be strong enough (i.e., ½ > ½ 3 ). 15 In contrast to the case of simultaneous moves, too strong an externality (i.e., ½ > ½ 4 ) will destroy the underpricing equilibrium in the current case. This is because¯rm 1 can entice highquality¯rm 2 to underprice and so, loosely put,¯rm 1 can choose between the underpricing equilibrium and the no-underpricing equilibrium. Only when the payo® in the underpricing equilibrium is higher than without underpricing does¯rm 1 choose to underprice IPO. Since large underpricing is costly, an underpricing equilibrium is not always better than no-underpricing. In particular, when ½ > ½ 4 , the amount of underpricing required to separate a high-quality¯rm from a low-quality one is so large that makes underpricing not worthwhile to¯rm 1.
Multiplicity of equilibria disappears with sequential moves. However, this may be an artifact of the exogenously¯xed order of moves by the two¯rms. Being a¯rst mover is costly in the current setup. Firm 1 must underprice su±ciently in order to entice¯rm 2 to underprice. If rms could choose when to go to the IPO market, it would be likely that they choose to go to the market at the same date. Then, in the absence of coordination the multiplicity analyzed in the simple model would reappear. 16 
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that large magnitudes and the clustering of Internet IPO underpricing can be attributed to¯rms' desire to bene¯t from the industry's publicity. We assume that each rm has private information about its quality and, if perceived as high-quality, a¯rm's expected earnings increase with the industry's publicity that is generated by all¯rms' IPO underpricing.
In this environment, a high-quality¯rm will not underprice its IPO if it expects other¯rms not to underprice, but it will underprice its IPO if it expects other¯rms to do so and if the¯rm's expected earnings increase su±ciently with the industry's publicity. Thus there is clustering in IPO underpricing and the magnitude of underpricing is large if the publicity is great. The industry's publicity induces a high-quality¯rm to take such a costly action as IPO underpricing because the publicity increases the temptation for a low-quality¯rm to mimic a high-quality¯rm, which makes IPO underpricing necessary for a high-quality¯rm to separate itself out. Private information is critical for the story: If a¯rm's quality were public information, the publicity would only induce free-riding and eliminate underpricing altogether.
Although our analysis is phrased for the Internet industry, the results are not con¯ned to this industry but rather applicable to any industry where the industry's publicity is important to each good¯rm's expected earnings. At this general level, our results indicate that the clustering of large IPO underpricing is both fragile and speci¯c | fragile because large underpricing is unlikely to occur if other¯rms in the industry are not expected to underprice; speci¯c because important for the story is some publicity that¯rms collectively bene¯t from. Thus, the clustering of underpricing may be only a temporary phenomenon for new industries such as the Internet industry where publicity is likely to yield a large bene¯t initially. As the industry becomes established, competition against other¯rms in the same industry becomes more important than against¯rms in traditional sectors. In this case one¯rm's underpricing may hurt rather than bene¯t other¯rms in the same industry and so clustering of large IPO underpricing becomes rare. 17 Alternatively, clustering of large underpricing may disappear when there is adverse news about the new industry. 18 The fragility and speci¯city of the clustering of underpricing might explain why there is no strong evidence supporting a monotonic relationship between¯rms' IPO underpricing and expected earnings (Michaely and Shaw (1994) ).
Our model also indicates that clustering of IPO underpricing is more likely to occur when the marginal borrowing cost is low than when it is high, or when the average return to¯rms is high than when it is low. Thus, even for established industries, more¯rms will underprice IPOs when the economy is in good times than in bad times. Moreover, the model suggests that there need not be a general, monotonic relationship between the fraction of the stake withheld by thē rm's original owners and the¯rm's expected earnings, a relationship emphasized by pervious signalling models but rejected empirically by Michaely and Shaw (1994) .
To conclude the paper, we note that IPO underpricing is a form of advertisement for a¯rm. This is true in previous signalling models, but more so in the current model since the intention to underprice here is to bene¯t from the industry's publicity. The question is then why a¯rm chooses this form of advertisement over other advertising methods. As explained by Allen and 17 Competition among¯rms in the industry corresponds to the case ½ < 0. Since underpricing is the best response to other¯rms' underpricing only if ½D > bx ¡1 L ¡ R0(xH =xL ¡ 1) (see (3.15) and (3.16)), under Assumption 1D there cannot be an underpricing equilibrium when ½ < 0.
18 An example is the Biotech industry that experienced large underpricing in IPOs at the beginning of the 1990s. The heat over biotech stocks cooled down considerably when the Food and Drug Administration rejected several promising drugs such as Centocor Inc.'s Centoxin, a medicine meant to¯ght a deadly bacteria infection common in surgery patients.
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Faulhaber (1989), other advertising methods must be monitored in order for them to be credible, which may be costly or impossible for each investor. In contrast, IPO underpricing requires no monitoring and regulations require the¯rm to commit to the o®er price. IPO underpricing also reduces the probability of lawsuits if subsequently the¯rm does not do well. More speci¯c to the environment in this paper, other advertising methods may not be e®ective when the entire industry has just started. In contrast, large gains in share prices of¯rms in the industry are \hard" evidence that might convince investors about the industry's bright future.
For Lemma 3.1, we have:
The¯rst inequality follows from substituting the lower bound for f 0 in (3.5); the second inequality follows from the fact that the preceding expression is increasing in x; and the last inequality follows from the fact that the preceding expression is increasing in q 0 . The same procedure establishes
For Lemma 3.2, the monotone and concavity features of S H (q) and IND L (q) can be veri¯ed directly. To prove other properties stated in the lemma, note that
The third inequality above follows from Lemma 3.1.
Consider¯rst the case Q 1 < 0 (see Figure 2a) . In this case the relevant range of q is q 2 [0; 1].
Since Q 1 < 0, we have
Thus, the curve IND L (q) lies above the curve S H (1) at both ends. If we can show that the curve IND L (q) crosses the curve S H (q) always from below if they ever cross each other in the positive quadrant, then there cannot be any crossing between the two curves, i.e.,
To show the crossing property, suppose that the two curves cross each other at
has the same sign as that of the following expression:
The expression in f:g is clearly positive. Also, Assumption 1A implies 
. Therefore, there is a unique crossing between the two curves.
which is a decreasing function of q. Along f = S H (q), a high-quality¯rm's payo® is
which is an increasing function of q. QED
B. Proofs of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4
We locate the position of the pooling action (f 0 ; q 0 ). Since the pooling action must satisfy (3.5), it must lie on or above the curve f = S ® (q). Also, it can be veri¯ed that IND L (q 0 ) > f 0 and so the point (f 0 ; q 0 ) must lie below the curve f = IND(q). This implies f 0 > f b in the case Q 1 > 0 (see Figure 2b ).
Consider¯rst the case Q 1 > 0 (Figure 2b ). Since f b < f 0 in this case and R H > R ® , the gain to a high-quality¯rm from the deviation to (f b ; q b ) is strictly positive. Thus there cannot be a pooling equilibrium in this case. The only equilibrium is a separating equilibrium (f ¤ ; q ¤ ) de¯ned by (3.14) . The condition corresponding to this case,
L . Now consider the case Q 1 · 0, where the separating actions are given by (3.13). These actions may not necessarily generate a higher payo® to a high-quality¯rm than in the pooling equilibrium. In fact, since
the gain to a high-quality¯rm from deviating from the pooling action to (f b ; q b ) is strictly positive if and only if q 0 > 1¡R ® =R H . Thus, (f ¤ ; q ¤ ) form a unique separating equilibrium against pooling 25 actions with q 0 su±ciently close to 1. In this case the corresponding condition (Q 1 · 0) becomes
L . This completes the proof of Proposition 3.3. For Proposition 3.4, we know from the above that a pooling action satis¯es the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion if and only if (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), Q 1 · 0 and q 0 · 1 ¡ R ® =R H are all satis¯ed.
From the de¯nition of Q 0 in (3.4) we have Q 0 > 0 if and only if R ® ¡ 1 ¡ bE ® x ¡1 < 0, i.e., i®
Note that ® 0 2 (0; 1) under Assumption 1A. Consider the case ® > ® 0 and so Q 0 < 0, in which case all q 0 2 (0; 1 ¡ R ® =R H ] satisfy (3.4). For any such q 0 , let f 0 be such that (3.5) holds with equality and note f 0 2 (0; 1). The payo® to a low-quality¯rm from this pooling action is
Both terms of the product are increasing functions of q 0 (for q 0 > 0 > Q 0 ). Thus the payo® is maximized by setting q 0 = 1 ¡ R 0 =R H . If this maximum pooling payo® satis¯es (3.3) with strict inequality, then there exist q's lower than but close to q 0 that satisfy (3.3) as well. After
H ), the requirement that the maximum pooling payo® satisfy (3.3) with strict inequality can be written as
The left-hand side of the above inequality is an increasing function of ®. When ® = 0, its value is negative. When ® = 1, its value has the same sign as
This is positive, since R H¸R0 + bx ¡1 L (as Q 1 · 0) and the above expression has a value 0 when R H = R 0 + bx ¡1 L . Therefore there exists ® 2 (0; 1) such that (3.3) is satis¯ed with strict inequality for the above described (f 0 ; q 0 ) if ® > ®. De¯ne ¹ ®´maxf® 0 ; ®g. For ® > ¹ ®, there exist pooling actions (f 0 ; q 0 ) that satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. These actions can be supported as pooling equilibria for given R H by the following beliefs: Any deviation from such (f 0 ; q 0 ) is believed to be coming from a low-quality¯rm.
On the other hand, if ® < ®, no pooling action satis¯es the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
QED.
C. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Let V 0 L be the payo® to a low-quality from a pooling action (f 0 ; q 0 ). As in the simple model, we¯nd separating actions that generate lower payo®s to a low-quality¯rm than in a pooling 26 equilibrium. Then we choose the best among these actions as a candidate for the action of a high-quality¯rm in a separating equilibrium. If a low-quality¯rm deviates from the pooling action to an action (f; q) and is perceived as a high-quality¯rm, the payo® is
where W = R 0 x H =x L + ½D and z = ½°b=x H + (1 ¡ ½°)b=x L . This payo® is less than that in the pooling equilibrium if and only if
Figures 6a and 6b here.
Let us divide the proof into two cases.
This case is depicted in Figure 6a . Let S H (q) now denote the right-hand side of (5.3) and let its inverse be S ¡1 H . It can be shown that there exists°1 > 0 such that G(f ) > S ¡1 H (f ) in the region f < ½°=(1 + z) if°·°1, as depicted in Figure 6a . Restrict attention to°·°1. In this case the relevant region is f > ½°=(1 + z) and the shaded area is the set of actions that yield lower payo® to a low-quality¯rm but may yield higher payo® to a high-quality¯rm than in the pooling equilibrium. The following properties can be veri¯ed for the segment of G(f ) with f > ½°=(1 + z):
e., i® f is higher than point A).
(1c) The payo® to a high-quality¯rm from taking actions along q = G(f ) is decreasing in f .
These properties imply that, if°·°1, the best deviation for a high-quality¯rm from a pooling equilibrium is point A in Figure 6a . In this case, q = s = 0 and there is underpricing as in the corresponding case in the simple model.
In this case, the best deviations for a high-quality¯rm in the region f < ½°=(1 + z) lie on the curve f = S H (q) and, by property (2c) below, they are strictly dominated by the action at point A in Figure 6b . Thus, it su±ces to consider only the region f > ½°=(1 + z). The curve q = G(f ) for f > ½°=(1 + z) is depicted by Figure 6b , where the shaded area is the set of deviations that are feasible to a¯rm (when perceived as a high-quality¯rm as a result of deviation) and that generate lower payo®s to a low-quality¯rm than in the pooling equilibrium. A lengthy exercise can establish the following properties, some of which are depicted in Figure 6b: (2a) There exists a level f c 2 (½°=(1 + z); 1) such that the curve q = G(f ) is decreasing in f for f 2 (½°=(1 + z); f c ) and increasing in f for f 2 (f c ; 1).
(2b) S H (1) = 1=W > ½°=(1 + z) and G(1=W ) < 1. That is, the intersection between the curve f = S H (q) and q = 1 lies in the region q > G(f ) and f > ½°=(1 + z). Since the curve f = S H (q) starts outside this region when q is small, there is at least one intersection between f = S H (q) and q = G(f ), as depicted by point A in Figure 6b. (2c) The payo® to a high-quality¯rm from taking actions along the curve f = S H (q) is increasing in q.
(2d) The payo® to a high-quality¯rm from taking actions along the curve q = G(f ) (for
(2e) There exists°2 > 0 such that, if°·°2, then the intersection (point A) has f¸(½°=W ) 1=2 .
These properties imply that, if°·°2, the payo® to a high-quality¯rm from deviating from the pooling action is maximized at the intersection between the curve f = S H (q) and q = G(f ), such as point A in Figure 6b . There is no underpricing in this case.
When ® is su±ciently small, in both case 1 and case 2 one can also show that the payo® at point A to a high-quality¯rm is higher than the payo® in the pooling equilibrium, provided that the market views such deviation as coming from a high-quality¯rm. Thus, the action given by point A is the separating equilibrium that satis¯es the Cho-Kreps criterion. Substitute W = R 0 x H =x L + ½D and note that the payo® to a low-quality¯rm is R 0 ¡ 1 in the absence of pooling (thus V 0 L in the above analysis is replaced by R 0 ¡ 1). We have,
To solve for market equilibria, impose symmetry d = D. Doing so for case 1 yields
Thus, d > 0 only if ½ < 1=(1 +°). Also, (C.1) must be satis¯ed in order to have D > 0, i.e., 
D. Proof of Proposition 5.2
We have already argued in the text that¯rm 2 underprices only if¯rm 1 underprices su±ciently (i.e., if d 1¸D0 ). Analogous to the derivation of (C.1) in Appendix C, we have: 
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In addition to the requirement ½ 2 (½ 3 ; ® ¡1=2 ), the payo® to¯rm 1 (when it is high-quality) must be higher with d 1 > 0 than with d 1 = 0 in order for the¯rm to underprice. With d 1 = 0, the payo® to high-quality¯rm 1 is
where the inequalities come from substituting the de¯nitions of (f ¤ ; q ¤ ) in (3.14) . Substituting W and simplifying, the payo® to the¯rm is higher with underpricing than without if and only if 1 ¡ ®½
There exists ½ 4 2 (0; ® ¡1=2 ) such that the above condition is satis¯ed if and only if 0 · ½ < ½ 4 .
The level ½ 4 is not necessarily greater than Figure 6b When a high-quality¯rm has its own in°uence on publicity: Case 2 (small W )
